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I. INTRODUCTION
D URING THE past five years, the United States defense and
commercial aerospace industries have experienced an un-
precedented wave of mergers and acquisitions. More than two
dozen major firms have merged into three giants: Boeing-Mc-
Donnell Douglas, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon-Hughes.'
Boeing's recent $14 billion merger with McDonnell Douglas
and $3.1 billion merger with Rockwell International's aerospace
and defense unit resulted in a company with $48 billion in an-
nual sales and an estimated 225,000 employees. 2 Moreover, Ray-
theon is in the process of a $2.95 billion merger with Texas
Instruments and a $9 billion merger with Hughes Aircraft; the
product of the merger will be a company with annual revenues
of $17 billion.' Additionally, Lockheed Martin recently pro-
posed an $11.2 billion merger with Northrop Grumman, where
the result would have been a company with $37 billion in annual
sales and 230,000 employees.4 Although the merger was never
realized, Lockheed Martin remains the number two company in
the United States, with annual sales of $28 billion. 5 The specif-
ics of the failed merger are discussed infra Part II.
Although Boeing-McDonnell Douglas (worth $48 billion in
annual sales), Lockheed Martin ($28 billion annual sales), and
I See Vago Muradian, Battle for UDLP Proves that Consolidation Trend is Continu-
ing, DEF. DAILY, Aug. 15, 1997, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Dfdly File.
2 See Andy Patrizio, Mergers Pose IT Challenge, INFO. WEEK, Sept. 22, 1997, at 105,
available in 1997 WL 14148022; Carol Haber, Defense Fireworks Light 4th, ELEC.
NEWS (1991),July 7, 1997, at 1.
3See Kevin O'Toole, Aerospace Top 100: Only the Beginning, FLIGHT INT'L, Aug.
20, 1997, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Prompt File; Bruce Balestier, Billion-
Dollar DeaLs; Consolidation, Strategic Planning Drive Activity, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 1997,
at 5. At the time of publication, consolidation and streamlining of the two com-
panies were under way.
' See Andy Dworkin, Lockheed Martin to Buy Northrop Crumman, DAL[AS MORNING
NEWS, July 4, 1997, at IA, 34A. Some sources report that the value of the merger
would have been as low as $8.3 billion. See Teddie Weyr, Lockheed Terminates
Northrop Merger, A.P. ONLINE, July 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6696370. Other
sources report the merger price was $10.7 billion. See Shareholder's Suit Alleges
Northrop Inflated Stock Price, OPANGE COUNlY REG.,July 25, 1998, at C2, available in
1998 WL 2639760 [hereinafter Shareholder's Suit].
5 See Weyr, supra note 4.
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Raytheon ($17 billion annual sales) are the top three defense
industry competitors, it is worth noting that Boeing and Lock-
heed are significantly larger than the nearest competitor, Ray-
theon.6 The consolidation of the top American aerospace and
defense companies "carried out under the watchful eye of the
Pentagon, appears to be largely complete. The endgame ...
has[, however,] left only two fully capable platform manufactur-
ers in Boeing and Lockheed Martin. 7
But why has the aerospace industry declined from almost fifty
independent competitors in 1985 to only three in 1999?8 What
has driven the merger wave, and what will be the competitive
effect of such consolidation?
Part II of this article discusses recent merger and acquisition
activities in the United States. Part III is a historical overview of
demands within the defense industry leading up to the heavy
merger and acquisition activity. Part IV discusses the Big Three
Mergers, while Part V examines the fight between the Big Three
for the largest defense contract in history. Part VI and VII high-
light the international and local effects of the Big Three Merg-
ers. Specifically, they discuss the mergers' effects on the
European market and on all second and third-tier companies,
respectively. Part VIII is a brief analysis of other global markets
in the wake of the U.S. mergers.
II. MERGER AND ACQUISITION ACTIVITY IN THE
UNITED STATES
In recent years, mergers and acquisitions have taken a leading
role in many corporate business strategies.9 Companies, adher-
ing to the philosophies of world-wide competition and eco-
nomic efficiency, are spinning off unnecessary divisions and
acquiring divisions that support their overall business plans.' 0
To illustrate, in 1995 the total value of mergers in the United
States involving U.S. companies was roughly $458 billion,1" but
6 See O'Toole, supra note 3.
7 Id.
8 See Hearing on Defense Mergers Antitrust Implications Before the Subcomm. on Anti-
trust, Bus. Rights & Competition of the Senate Judiciay Comm., 105th Cong. (1997)
(statement of Mike Dewine, Senator from Ohio).
9 See DennisJ. Block et al., Current Trends in the Market for Corporate Control, 972
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in 1994, mergers only totaled $347.1 billion, which is a stagger-
ing $110.9 billion increase in just one year. 12
Globally speaking, the value of corporate mergers in 1994 was
at an all time high of $572 billion.13 This record was crushed in
1995 when corporate mergers increased fifty-one percent and
totaled roughly $866 billion.14 Moreover, in 1996, corporations
announced deals totaling an even more impressive $1.14 tril-
lion.' 5 The telecommunications and defense industries and the
mega-mergers occurring within them helped push the total to
this astonishing amount.
Acquisitions made overseas by U.S. companies rose substan-
tially from $31.4 billion in 1994 to $53 billion in 1995.16 Addi-
tionally, foreign purchases of American companies increased
from $44 billion in 1994 to $50.2 billion in 1995.17
In fact, there were 10,300 domestic deals officially announced
in 1996, which makes it the most active year in merger and ac-
quisition history. Coupled with a strong market and perceived
low inflation, the merger and acquisition activity hit records -
surpassing the 1995 record of only 9030 deals worth $522
billion.19
Factors influencing those "trends in the market for corporate
control" included "(i) the strength of the national economy; (ii)
the level of the stock market; (iii) the availability of acquisition
financing; and (iv) legislation and agency action that has or will
lead to deregulation in certain industries."2
Because the aforementioned factors sparked the drive for cor-
porate control, two characteristics are particularly apparent in
today's market.
First, there "is a substantial increase in the number and value
of strategic transactions," which is "where a company acquires or
merges with another ... or divests itself of a subsidiary ... in




15 See Louis S. Freeman, General Overview and Strategies in Representing Sellers, 403
PLI/TAx 7, 15 (1997).
16 See Block, supra note 9, at 12.
17 See id.
18 See Freeman, supra note 15, at 15.
19 See id. at 15-16.
20 See Block, supra note 9, at 12.
21 Id.
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chaser, in these transactions, sees the target as a business whose
"operations would strategically supplement or complement [its]
existing operations. '2 2 Therefore, the company to be acquired
is either in the same industry as the purchaser or "is in a busi-
ness that would allow the acquirer to integrate vertically with the
target and gain long-term benefits. ' 23 A strategic divestment, on
the other hand, occurs when a corporation gets rid of a subsidi-
ary or the like that does not supplement or complement its
long-term goals or business philosophies.24
Second, the number of financial transactions continues to be
small. A financial acquisition results when an investor acquires
an undervalued company in order to use the company's cash
reserves or assets. 25 In a financial acquisition, the target and its
purchaser may not even be in the same industry, much less ben-
efit each other.26
In the market for corporate control, there is a trend toward
long-term strategic transactions and away from mere financial
acquisitions.2 1 Strategic deals are usually negotiated transac-
tions, and they take longer to close and have a higher rate of
failure than the pure financial transaction. 28
Aside from the increase in strategic transactions, there is an
increase in the number of "mega-size" deals.29 There were sev-
enty-five merger and acquisitions (M&A) in 1995 that individu-
ally totaled $1 billion or more, and they collectively totaled
$199.1 billion.3" These seventy-five M&A deals were 51.3% of
the total value of deals throughout 1995.31 Only forty-seven
"mega-size" deals valuing $135.4 billion occurred in 1994.2
Interestingly, it is the nation's two hundred largest industrial
corporations that led the wave of mega-mergers. 33 "They not




25 See id. at 12-13
26 See id. at 13.
27 See id.
28 See id.




33 See Walter Adams &James W. Brock, The 'New Learning' and the Euthanasia of
Antitrust, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1515, 1541 (1986).
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- increasingly- they have merged with one another. '34 Merg-
ers of this magnitude are occurring in the aerospace and de-
fense industries and are having a tremendous world-wide
impact.
III. THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY'S RECENT HISTORY
After the Cold War, defense budgets and expenditures for
military procurement diminished, which ultimately caused a de-
crease in the number of weapons programs.15 The total U.S.
defense budget declined 35.4% from $390 billion (in FY-97 dol-
lars) in 1985 to $252 billion in 1997.36 More importantly, how-
ever, it is the procurement budget that suffered from these
massive cuts. It has fallen sixty-five percent from $125 billion (in
FY-97 dollars) in 1985 to about $44 billion in 1997. 37 "A decline
in demand of this magnitude, which occurred in an industry
that had invested heavily in plants and infrastructure in the early
1980's based on expectations of continued growth in the de-
mand for weapons and military systems, led quickly to over-
capacity among defense contractors. ' 38  As a result, such
overcapacity led to increased overhead for military programs.3 9
The defense industry thus "responded by reducing capacity
through consolidation, which has resulted in a significant de-
cline in the number of defense contractors."40
The 1995 $10 billion merger of the then top two and three
defense contractors, Lockheed Corporation and Martin Mari-
etta, led up to the Big Three Mergers in the U.S. aerospace and
defense industries.4' This merger followed the $2.17 billion
merger of Grumman Corporation and Northrop Corporation in
1994.42
The Lockheed Martin merger is an example of a defense
merger entered into under a consent agreement with the Fed-
34 Id.
35 See Prepared Statement of Robert Pitofsky Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Bus.
Rights and Competition of the Senate judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. (1997) (statement
of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission).





41 See Martin Marietta-Lockheed Merger is Approved, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1995 at
D4.
42 See Roy J. Harris, Jr., Northrop Offer of $2.17 Billion Wins Grumman, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 5, 1994, at A3, available in 1994 WL-WSJ 298095.
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eral Trade Commission (Commission) to remedy antitrust con-
cerns. The antitrust problem existed in "the market for Space-
Based InfraRed Early Warning (SBIR) Satellite Systems, a $22
billion satellite system that uses highly sophisticated electro[-
]optical sensors to detect hostile missile launches against the
United States or its allies."43 Lockheed, which teamed with
Hughes, and Martin Marietta, which teamed with Northrop
Grumman, were the top two teams competing for the SBIR con-
tract. As part of the Commission's consent order, Lockheed and
Martin Marietta were prohibited from enforcing their teaming
agreements with their respective partner. Thus, new teams were
created to fight Lockheed Martin for the contract.44
Other mergers creating the merger wave included Martin
Marietta's $208.5 million acquisition of General Dynamic's
space systems division1 5 and its $3.05 billion purchase of Gen-
eral Electric's aerospace division.46 Lockheed also purchased
General Dynamic's Tactical Military Aircraft operation for $1.52
billion,47 while Hughes Aircraft Co. bought General Dynamic
Corp.'s missiles division for $450 million."8 The Carlyle Group,
for $200 million, acquired Textron's aerostructures business."
Loral Corp., Carlyle Group and Northrop Corp. separately
purchased LTV's missiles and aircraft divisions for $476 mil-
lion.5 0 The Carlyle Group also purchased General Dynamic's
electronics division for $60 million and later sold it to Tracor for
$110 million.51 Carlyle, in the same year, purchased Vought
from LTV, "strengthened it, and sold it to Northrop Grumman
43 Pitofsky, supra note 35, at V.
44 See id.
45 See Martin Marietta Carp.: Acquisition is Completed of General Dynamics Unit,
WALL ST. J., May 3, 1994, at B4, available in 1994 WL-WSJ 294634.
46 See Division Won't Attack Martin Marietta Deal, 64 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) No. 1609, at 397 (Apr. 8, 1993); see also Alexander Nicoll, Pentagon
Changes Defence Game, FINANCIAL POST (Bloomberg), Mar. 31, 1998, available in
1998 WL 10757577.
47 See Lockheed's Purchase of General Dynamics' Fighter Unit is Closed, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 2, 1993, at A12, available in 1993 WL-WSJ 711130.
48 See Steven Pearlstein, General Dynamics to Sell Unit; Hughes Expands Missile
Business with Purchase, WASH. POST, May 12, 1992, at C1, available in 1992 WL
2188510.
49 See Muradian, supra note 1.
50 See Frederick Rose, Loral, Northrop, Carlyle Complete LTV Acquisitions, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 1, 1992, at A6, available in 1992 WL-WSJ 638419.
51 See Muradian, supra note 1; Carlyle Group: Firm Completes Purchase of General
Dynamics Unit, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1992, available in 1992 WL-WSJ 626377.
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for a $100 million profit. 5 2 Olin Corp. purchased Aerojet,5 3
and Loral purchased IBM's Federal Systems Co. 54 and Ford Mo-
tor Co.'s aerospace division. 55 In short, the aerospace and de-
fense industries have never seen such a high level of mergers
and acquisitions.
The effect of the aforementioned wave of mergers and acqui-
sitions is that big corporations have become even larger and
stronger, and the population of defense industry competitors
has diminished drastically.
IV. THE BIG THREE MERGERS IN THE UNITED STATES
"The worldwide airline industry employs over 21 million peo-
ple and accounts for [at least] $740 billion or 4% of the world's
economic production. '56 Thus, mergers that are of the magni-
tude of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas, the Raytheon-Hughes,
and the proposed Lockheed Martin-Northrop Grumman merg-
ers naturally must withstand scrutiny from the U.S. Government.
However, the market for large commercial aircraft is world-wide,
and the European Union, with a similar competitive structure, is
an integral part of this world market. While European airlines
will potentially make-up almost one-third of purchasers over the
next ten years, the combined market share of Boeing-McDon-
nell Douglas is about two-thirds of the European Union mar-
ket.57 Thus, the United States and the European Union share
concerns over anticompetitive mergers in the aerospace indus-
try. As a result, both the U.S. Government and the European
Commission must approve mergers of this magnitude.
A. BOEING-McDONNELL DOUGLAS
"[F] ollowing one of the most detailed and wide-ranging inves-
tigations in the history of merger enforcement," the Federal
Trade Commission did not challenge Boeing's acquisition of
52 Muradian, supra note 1.
53 See CenCorp Completes Sale of Line, WALL ST.J., May 3, 1994, at C13, available in
1994 WL-WSJ 294597.
54 See Loral Corp.: IBM's Federal System Unit Is Bought for $1.52 Billion, WALL ST.J.,
Mar. 2, 1994, at B4, available in 1994 WL-WSJ 302921.
55 See Charles W. Stevens & Rick Wartzman, Loral Wins Bid to Buy Ford's Aero-
space Unit, WALL ST. J., July 24, 1990, at A3, available in 1990 WL-WSJ 568507.
56 James C. Lanik, Stopping the Tailspin: Use of Oligopolistic and Oligopsonistic
Power to Produce Profits in the Airline Industry, 22 TRANsp. L.J. 509, 510 (1995).
57 See The Commission Clears the Merger Between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas
Under Conditions and Obligations, RAPID, July 30, 1997 available in LEXIS, Eurcom
Library, Rapid File [hereinafter Commission].
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McDonnell Douglas."8 The Commission concluded that "the ac-
quisition would not substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in the global commercial aircraft market.
59
On the military side, the Commission found that "Boeing and
McDonnell Douglas currently develop fighter aircraft and mili-
tary helicopters for different missions, and there are no antici-
pated Defense Department procurements of fighter aircraft or
military helicopters or other domestic military markets in which
the two firms would likely compete. '"60
The result of the $14 billion merger between the world's larg-
est civilian aircraft company and one of the biggest U.S. military
contractors was the world's largest aerospace and defense com-
pany.61 At the time, Boeing dominated the large commercial
aircraft market with sixty-four percent of the market share.
62
Additionally, McDonnell Douglas was "the world's number two
defen[s]e manufacturer and leading manufacturer of military
aircraft.
63
For 1997, Boeing reported its first yearly loss in fifty years. 64
Boeing's pretax charge against fourth quarter earnings for the
merger was slightly more than expected at $1.4 billion.65 After
taxes, the charge for McDonnell Douglas was about $0.91 per
share.66 In addition to competing for the joint strike fighter
contract, discussed infra Part VI, Boeing planned to start the
new 737 production line at the Douglas factory in Long Beach,
California.6 7 Boeing-McDonnell Douglas is also in the process
of consolidating its own commercial, space, and defense
facilities.68
58 Pitofsky, supra note 35, at V.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 See Stanley Holmes, European Restructuring Urged to Compete with Boeing, SEAT-
TLE TIMES, June 17, 1997, at El, available in 1997 WL 3239040.
62 See Commission, supra note 57.
63 Id.
64 See Laurence Zuckerman, $1.4 Billion Boeing Charge to Force First Yearly Loss
Since '47, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1998, at D5.
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 See State Battles for Jet Fighter; Boeing May Choose Facility in St. Louis, L.A. DAILY
NEws, Aug. 10, 1998, at N3, available in 1998 WL 3866480 [hereinafter State
Battles].
68 SeeJames Wallace et al., Boeing Would Pick St. Louis for Fighter Assembly, Report
Says Project Would be World's Biggest Defense Program, Lockheed Also Seeks Contract, ST.
Louis POsT-DIsPATCH, Aug. 10, 1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL 3347112.
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Currently, "Boeing builds the F-15 Eagle, the F-18 Hornet,
and the F-18 Super Hornet. . ., as well as the T-45 Goshawk jet
trainer and the re-manufactured Harrier II Plus for the Marine
Corps."6 9 The Navy could purchase 548 of the new F-18 Super
Hornets.")
B. RAYTHEON-HUGHES
The Justice Department decided on July 2, 1997, to approve
Raytheon's merger with Texas Instruments "on the condition
that Raytheon [sell Texas Instrument's] defense radar
microchip-making unit. '71 This division of Texas Instruments
produced leading edge, "high-power[ed] amplifier monolithic
microwave integrated circuits (MMICs) ' 72 chips that "extend the
power and range of radars, enabling them to scan airspace
quickly and efficiently with a lower probability of detection" by
enemies. 73 MMIC products are distinct from other products be-
cause they are made with gallium arsenide, a substance that is
harder and faster than the silicon used in other circuits. 74
"Raytheon [was] required to sell TI's MMIC business within
180 days, or within five days from the time the court approve [d]
the settlement, to a firm 'having both the capability and intent
to continue to develop, make and sell MMICs that meet [De-
partment of Defense] requirements."'7 5 Without this condition,
the price of advanced military radars would have increased dra-
matically.76 These high prices would have impacted taxpayers as
well as the DOD.77
The Raytheon-Hughes merger also underwent "intense scru-
tiny in the air-to-air missile arena. '78 In addition, Lockheed
Martin is scaling back infrared units, which means Raytheon-
Hughes could potentially corner the infrared defense market. 79
The merger was nevertheless approved.
69 Id.
70 See id.
71 Mergers and Acquisitions: News in Brief, FACTS ON FILE WORLI) NEWS DIG., Sept.
4, 1997, at Al.
72 Id.
73 Anthony L. Velocci, Jr., Raytheon, Rivals Score with TI Compromise, AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., July 7, 1997, at 45.





79 See Infrared Reductions, AEROSPACE DAILY, Aug. 11, 1997, at 220.
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Interestingly, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
(BMDO) was recently seeking a Lead System Integrator to de-
velop the National Missile Defense (NMD) system. Boeing with
Hughes and the United Missile Defense Co. (UMDC) (which is
a partnership between Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and TRW)
separately contracted to study the NMD system before the Ray-
theon-Hughes merger was realized. 0
Although both Raytheon and Hughes were studying the ef-
fort, the Pentagon ultimately awarded Boeing the $1.6 billion
contract to oversee the National Missile Defense program. "The
contract includes options for up to seven years of continued de-
velopment effort. It is potentially worth $5.2 billion" for
Boeing."l
After the Raytheon-Hughes merger, Raytheon planned to cut
at least "8000 jobs and take a pretax charge of as much as $400
million [in order] to wring costs from the $12.5 billion in de-
fense acquisitions made [in 1997]."82
C. LOCKHEED MARTIN
"Lockheed Martin is a highly diversified [corporation] princi-
pally engaged in the research, design, development, manufac-
ture and integration of advanced-technology products and
services. [Its] core businesses span aeronautics, electronics, en-
ergy and environment, information and services, space and stra-
tegic missiles, telecommunications and systems integration. 8 3
In 1994, Northrop Corporation and Grumman Corporation
merged to form Northrop Grumman. Lockheed Corporation
and Martin Marietta merged in 1995, creating Lockheed Martin.
In 1997, Lockheed Martin planned to merge with Northrop
Grumman, thereby creating what would have been the second
largest aerospace and defense company in the world. The two
companies entered into a definitive agreement in order to "fur-
80 See Defense Brief, DEF. DAILY, Aug.15, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8106993; see
also Boeing Wins $1.6 Billion NMD Contract, DEF. DAILY, May 1, 1998, available in
1998 WL 7193867 [hereinafter Boeing Wins].
81 Id.
82 Raytheon is Expected to Cut at Least 8,000 Jobs, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 22,
1998, at B5; Raytheon May Cut Deeply, PITTSBURGH POsT-GAZETTE, Jan. 22, 1998, at
C1.
83 Lockheed Martin and CSOC Partners Demonstrate Model Architecture For Future
Space Operations, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 21, 1998, available in LEXIS, Market Library,
Iacnws File.
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ther enhance efficiencies and increase global competition. 8 4
The product of the merger would have been a corporation that
was originally "more than 20 once-independent companies. ' 5
The merger, however, was never realized.
1. The Proposed Lockheed Martin-Northrop Grumman Merger
The proposed merger was valued at roughly $11.2 billion, and
the merger would have produced a company with $37 billion in
annual sales, a close second to Boeing-McDonnell Douglas. 6
The proposed larger company "would have combined what
[was] five independent companies just three years ago, and
would have solidified Lockheed Martin's position as the nation's
largest defense contractor," accounting for twenty-five percent
of the Pentagon's budget.8
7
The companies' product lines were to compliment each other
in that Northrop Grumman offered a large commercial airplane
components division and expertise in stealth technology, two di-
visions Lockheed Martin had not yet delved into. 8 Both compa-
nies build weapons and warfare systems for jets, and the bigger
Lockheed Martin would "have cornered the market in some
types of electronic warplane systems."89
Furthermore, "Northrop Grumman... joined Lockheed Mar-
tin's bid to develop and build the Joint Strike Fighter, a next
generation warplane," in direct competition with Boeing for the
$200 billion contract, which will ultimately be awarded in
2001.90 Unfortunately, however, the U.S. Government
threatened to sue the two companies based on antitrust con-
cerns. This proposed merger is the largest challenged by the
U.S. Government.9 The government claimed that the two com-
panies, ifjoined, would hinder efficient competition in the elec-
tronics and missile warning systems areas.92
84 Northrop Grumman Reports Record 1997 Sales, Earnings; Operating Profit Exceeds
$1 Billion; Net Debt Reduced by $510 Million, PR NEWSWIRE,Jan. 21, 1998, available in
LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File.
85 Dworkin, supra note 4, at 34A.
86 See id. at Al. Not all sources agree on the value of the merger. See Weyr,
supra note 4 (anticipating $8.3 billion); Shareholder's Suit, supra note 4, at C2 (an-
ticipating $10.7 billion).
87 Weyr, supra note 4.
88 See Dworkin, supra note 4, at 34A.
89 Id.
90 Id.; see infra notes 111-23, and accompanying text.
91 See Weyr, supra note 4.
92 See id.
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Attorney General Janet Reno claimed that if the merger were
to go through, "America could face higher prices and lower
quality in advanced tactical and strategic aircraft, airborne early
warning radar systems, sonar system, and several types of
courtermeasure systems that save our pilots from being shot
down when they are flying in hostile skies."93 Her stated goal
was to protect soldiers' lives and taxpayers' wallets.94
2. The Result of the Failed Merger
Because the proposed merger failed, Lockheed Martin and
Northrop Grumman must develop new strategies to survive in
such a competitive market.
a. The Future of Lockheed Martin
Lockheed Martin, based in Bethesda, Maryland, remains a
world-wide corporation competing in five sectors with a total of
sixty business units.9 5 It has 173,000 employees and had $28 bil-
lion in sales in 1997.96 The company produces F-16 fighters in
Fort Worth, Texas, and will remain a heavy hitter in the aero-
space and defense industry. 97
b. The Future of Northrop Grumman
Kent Kresa, Northrop Grumman President and Chief Execu-
tive Officer, stated that although the merger was in the best in-
terests of its constituencies, Northrop Grumman "will continue
as a strong, independent competitor in the aerospace
marketplace."98
Northrop Grumman, headquartered in Los Angeles, Califor-
nia, currently makes B-2 stealth bombers and the MX missile.99
Moreover, as the sixth largest U.S. defense contractor, it had $9
billion in revenue in 199800 and 52,000 employees. 101
93 Id.
94 See id.
95 See Patrizio, supra note 2, at 105.
96 See Weyr, supra note 4.
97 See Wallace, supra note 68, at Al; Boeing Would Build Fighter in St. Louis, DAi-
LAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 10, 1998, at 2D, available in 1998 WL 13093719.
98 Weyr, supra note 4.
99 See id.
100 See Anthony L. Velocci, Jr., Dashed Merger Resets Clock for Acquisitive Defense
Rivals, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., July 27, 1998, at 23, available in 1998 WL
8144859.
101 See Weyr, supra note 4.
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One of Northrop Grumman's advantages is that it is not con-
strained by the acquisition limitations placed on the larger com-
panies. Hence, the company can grow in multiple directions.
For example, Northrop is looking into nonmilitary markets such
as information technology and commercial aerostructures. 1 2
Additionally, the company is "interested in expanding its de-
fense electronics franchise, which . . . has the greatest growth
potential." 03
Northrop Grumman primarily serves the following markets:
"airborne surveillance, airborne radar, countermeasures, mili-
tary subcontracts, and commercial aerostructures."'1 4 Further-
more, its revenues in these areas are comparable to (if not
greater than) those of its competitors. 5
Many analysts believe that, in this industry, size matters and
that Northrop must increase its overall size if it is to successfully
compete with Raytheon and Lockheed Martin. 06 But the possi-
bility remains "that Northrop Grumman ... could find itself the
target of another deep-pocketed suitor.'01 7 Even so, the com-
pany should take the time necessary to assess what is in its share-
holders' best interest and what makes the most business sense.
It is worth noting that in 1997 Northrop Grumman was valued
at $8.3 billion, and in 1998, it was worth only $5.2 billion, a $3.1
billion loss in value. 08 With its stock worth less daily, Northrop
Grumman may not be able to achieve the type of deals it
needs.'o
Interestingly, Daimler-Benz of Germany, General Electric
Company of Britain, and British Aerospace are all interested in
acquiring part or all of Northrop Grumman. 110
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V. THE FIGHT FOR THE LARGEST DEFENSE CONTRACT
IN HISTORY
The largest contract in military history will be awarded in
Spring 2001. The contract is to build the joint strike fighter, the
next generation warplane. It is potentially worth $750 billion
and could be a twenty to twenty-five year commitment.1"1 The
contract "could create 20,000 new aerospace jobs . .. and for
every aerospace job, it could create five to nine spin-off jobs."'' 12
Boeing and Lockheed are the finalists vying for the contract.
The joint strike fighter is "[i] ntended to serve the Air Force,
Navy, Marine Corps and British Royal Navy... [and] will be the
first fighter required to perform ... multiservice roles."' 3 Spe-
cifically, "[t]he Navy wants a fighter that can land and take off
from an aircraft carrier. [In addition, t]he Marines and Royal
Navy want a fighter that can replace Harrierjets, which are capa-
ble of short takeoff and vertical landing."' 14 The fighter must
also be capable of avoiding air and ground radar detection,
which means it must be stealthy.'
1 5
The U.S. Department of Defense could purchase almost 3000
of the fighters by 2020 at $219 billion." 6 Military experts esti-
mate that the joint strike fighter program has the potential to be
valued at $300 billion." 17
Boeing and Lockheed are in the process of building proto-
types, which will be completed by late 1999 or early 2000. Each
company will build two demonstration fighters that will compete
against the other company's two fighters. "[F]light testing will
be [conducted] at Edwards Air Force Base and later at the
Navy's Patuxent River test facility in Maryland." ' a If Boeing
wins the contract, the fighter could be produced in St. Louis,
Missouri; whereas, if Lockheed obtains the contract, the fighter
could be produced in Fort Worth, Texas.1 9 Because companies
are known to change their minds regarding production sites,
neither location is definite.





116 See id.; Wallace, supra note 68, at Al.
117 See Wallace, supra note 68, at Al.
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The Pentagon is supposedly trying to determine who can
build "the best airplane at the cheapest price. "12 ' There are,
however, multiple factors that enter the equation. For example,
some states will offer tax benefits for equipment purchased spe-
cifically for the joint strike fighter program, thereby decreasing
the bottom line cost of production. 121 In addition, there are al-
ways political forces that will try to bring a contract of this mag-
nitude to its home state. For example, if Boeing gets the Joint
Strike Fighter contract, they will probably produce the two larg-
est fighter projects in the country in St. Louis, Missouri. 122
In fact, this contract is so vital to the U.S. defense industry
that some experts anticipate that there will not be just one win-
ner. These experts anticipate that both Boeing and Lockheed
Martin will share the contract. 123
VI. THE STRUGGLE TO CONSOLIDATE AEROSPACE
AND DEFENSE INDUSTRIES IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
Due to the mega-merger wave in the aerospace and defense
industries in the United States, the world is entering a new aero-
space era with the international goal of consolidation; however,
it is only beginning.
A. HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN INDUSTRIES
While Boeing has at least sixty percent of the world's commer-
cial aircraft business, Europe has over thirty percent. 24 In fact,
"Europe's three biggest players, Aerospatiale, British Aerospace
and Daimler-Benz Aerospace, cannot [collectively make] the
same sales as Boeing- [McDonnell Douglas], ' 125 and corpora-
tions must make a move if they are to survive in such a competi-
tive market.
Europe actually does have the potential to consolidate and
compete with the big players in the United States. Currently in
Europe, there are at least thirty-two companies producing air-
120 Id.
21 See id.
122 See Wallace, supra note 68, at Al.
123 See id.
124 See Holmes, supra note 61, at El.
125 O'Toole, supra note 3.
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craft, helicopters, missiles, defense electronics and/or
satellites. 126
It is worth noting that the U.S. Government heavily invests in
aerospace research and development. The U.S. budget for mili-
tary procurement, including research, amounts to twice the sup-
port provided by the European Union Member States
combined.1 27 In addition, the support for the research for large
civil aircraft in the United States is around four times the sup-
port provided by the European Union and its Member States
combined. 128
Europe must concentrate on the world, defense-related mar-
ket that overall has a shrinking demand. Furthermore, there is
tension on Member States' defense budgets because there are
too many suppliers in the European defense industry. 129
Acknowledging that steps need to be taken, the European
Commission is taking "a European approach to the European
defen[s]e industries, which includes both short and long term
measures to increase European competitiveness in these
markets."3 0
B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, REMAINING HURDLES AND
THE OVERALL GOAL FOR EUROPE'S NEAR FUTURE
The European Commission will propose rules applicable to
the acquisition of defense equipment. 31 Specifically, the Euro-
pean Commission plans to protect certain confidential informa-
tion, especially that information a Member State feels is a matter
of national security.132
Consolidating Europe's defense industry will demand setting
standards used by Defense Ministries. Moreover, if civil and mil-
itary industries consolidate, duplication will decrease and eco-
nomic advantages will be realized. 33
126 Commission Urges Industry to Restructure, Keep Up with the U.S., EUROWATCH,
Oct. 31, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, Eurwch File.
127 See id.
128 See id.
129 See Defense Industry: Embryonic Common Policy, EUR. REP., Oct. 25, 1997, avail-
able in 1997 WL 13047467.
130 Id. (These measures include policies to deal with public defense contracts,
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Yet another short term measure needed to combat competi-
tion is aligning tariff arrangements for customs."' In 1988, the
European Commission proposed that the Council temporarily
suspend customs duties for certain military equipment, and that
the suspension be adopted as a permanent measure. 13 5 Differ-
ing national approaches for tariff arrangements for imports is
not acceptable. Thus, Article 28 of the European Community
(EC) Treaty is the "only permissible legal basis for granting au-
tonomous suspensions.""''"
The medium term measures to confront competition apply to
competition policy, export controls, structural funds, market ac-
cess, taxation, and institutional matters. 13 7 For example, the
Member States currently use an eight step approach to deter-
mine whether to grant a license for a specific export; whereas, a
two-step approach involving "exchanges of information on ex-
ports of weapons.., and the creation of a system for eliminating
distortions between the various national treatments" should be
followed. '
As far as taxation among Member States is concerned, the
proposals include the "exemption of goods and services for the
defen [s] e of Member States where the goods and services are to
be supplied within the EU."'3 9 There may also be "exemption of
goods and services for supranational collaborative programs for
[the] defen[s]e of Member States" and harmonization of which
goods and services could receive the value-added tax (VAT)
rates." "
Although the short and medium term measures appear prom-
ising, if adopted, some corporations may individually take steps
to enhance competition. For example, AlliedSignal and
BFGoodrich are rumored to have an eye on Europe141 . Further-
more, British Aerospace is allying with Lockheed Martin as illus-
trated by their relationship on a Joint Strike Fighter bid;
however, British Aerospace admitted that the priority should be
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capable of competing with the American giants. 142 General
Electric Corporation, which is not related to the GE in the
United States, may also begin to focus on the United States.143
Furthermore, US Airways recently placed an order for a maxi-
mum of 400 Airbuses. The US Airways order is the largest that
"Airbus has ever won and is a significant victory for the Euro-
pean consortium in the U.S. market, which is dominated by Boe-
ing. "144 Airbus, which is owned by Aerospatiale of France,
Daimler-Benz Aerospace of Germany, British Aerospace of the
United Kingdom and CASA of Spain, had 460 new orders in
1997, compared to 326 in 1996.145 "Airbus account[ed] for 43%
of new aircraft sold in the world since January [1997] and
hop[ed] to take 45% of the market over 1997 as a whole, . . .
[which] would place the European aircraft manufacturers
ahead of its target of 50% of the world market in 2002."146
The Airbus consortium, which groups manufacturers of civil-
ian aircraft from Britain, France, Germany, and Spain, "aims to
attack the monopoly Boeing has with its 747 aircraft. With the
A340-500 and 600 models at the lower end and the [A]3XX
(large passenger jet), [Airbus plans] to squeeze Boeing ... from
both sides. 1 47 "The A3XX large passengerjet will offer the larg-
est passenger capacity, with 480-600 seats per plane.1 48 Inter-
ested parties in the venture include a Japanese partner and
companies such as Alenia of Italy and Sweden's Saab.1 49 The
jumbo jet "will be faster, quieter, more cost-efficient and able to
fly farther than the [B]oeing 747."150 The A3XX will, however,
cost at least $10 billion per aircraft.151 Moreover, Airbus is talk-
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 Michael Skapinker, US Airways Confirms Big Airbus Order, FIN. TIMES
(London), Nov. 4, 1997, at 5.
145 See DASA FY Sales - 3 (Bischoff Sees Major Decisions on Shaping Industry), Ex-
TEL EXAMINER, Jan. 20, 1998, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Xinhua File.
146 Airbus Looks to Euro to Confirm Global Presence, TRANSPORT EUROPE, Oct. 25,
1997, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Eurtrn File (emphasis added).
147 DASA's Bischoff - 2 (DASA to Attack Boeing 747 Monopoly), EXTEL EXAMINER,




150 Airbus Weighing Super Passenger Jet, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 15, 1998,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Xinhua File.
151 See id.
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ing to a Chinese partner and Alenia about developing a new
100-seater aircraft to rival Boeing's 717 aircraft. 152
Airbus also embraced an order from the U.S. Air Force to
paint sixty A10 Thunderbolt aircrafts. While it may not appear
to be much, it is the first U.S. defense contract won by the com-
pany since the Gulf War. 151
Airbus must become the core of the entire aviation industry in
Europe, including the military aircraft market, if it is to success-
fully compete against Boeing. In response to Boeing's threaten-
ing market power, leaders of Britain, France and Germany
proposed, in December 1997, to expand the Airbus consortium,
which groups civilian aircraft industries of France, Germany,
Britain and Spain, into an "integrated company that would also
produce fighter jets, helicopters and missiles."' 54 The result
would be a civil-defense consortium that could compete with the
big American rivals. Once these companies consolidate, the
door is open for other European companies to join, specifically
Sweden's Saab-Scania AB, Italy's Finmeccanica and Dassault Avi-
ation SA, and Lagardere SCA's Matra division in France. 55 No
specific timetable is set for the consolidation efforts.
Italy appears "'extremely interested' in proposals for the reor-
gani[z]ation of the [E]uropean aerospace and defen[s]e elec-
tronics industry, and fully approves the reorgani[z]ation of
[A] irbus. ''156 The Italian Government is pushing Italian corpo-
rations to consolidate, and it is specifically planning for Alenia
to join the Airbus consortium. 157
Even without consolidating civil and defense sectors, Airbus is
doing extremely well in its aggressive attack on Boeing-McDon-
nell Douglas. Airbus won nearly forty percent of the market in
1996, and received an order for thirty-four aircraft (worth £1
billion, or roughly $1.5 billion) from Belgian flag-carrier Sabena
in 1997.158 At the end of October 1997, Airbus had 425 aircraft
152 See DASA's Bischoff supra note 146.
153 See id.
154 EU Official Welcomes Call for Aerospace Restructuring, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY,
Dec. 10, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Xinhua File.
155 See WRAP/Airbus-2: No Timetable for Broad-Based Combination, Dow JONES
NEWS SERV., March 27, 1998; Sieff, supra note 145, at A16.
156 Italy Backs European Aerospace Restructuring, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 9,
1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Xinhua File.
157 See id.
158 See Mark Milner, Airbus Order Closes Gap on Boeing, GUARDIAN (London),
Nov. 19, 1997, at 24.
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orders compared to Boeing's 469, and it appears Airbus is even
closer to its goal of fifty percent of the market. 159
Europe is feeling a sense of urgency to consolidate because
there is already such a disparity between the United States and
Europe in "such high-tech fields as lasers and optronic surveil-
lance."'160 But the sense of urgency has lessened somewhat since
Washington opposed the Lockheed Martin-Northrop Grumman
merger. According to Manfred Bischoff, then Chief Executive
Officer of Germany's Daimler-Benz Aerospace S.A. (DASA),
"[i]f Europe and the other countries are not prepared to take
up the challenge [imposed by American companies, specifically
in the high-tech weapons arena,] the United States may be head-
ing towards a singular technological position [of high-tech
weapons dominance] that will be permanent." '161
The unanimous vision, which will begin with the expansion of
Airbus, is a unified European Aerospace and Defense Company.
Efforts to expand the Airbus consortium, however, have been
thwarted by "France's reluctance to give up state control of Aer-
ospatiale and the defense electronics giant Thomson-CSF.
162
Fortunately, however, the French government recently an-
nounced a pending merger with Matra, which would make Aer-
ospatiale part of the private sector.163 Lagardere will be the
largest private owner holding thirty to thirty-three percent of the
combined group.1 64 Although the state will retain less than fifty
percent, it will nevertheless be the largest shareholder.' 65
The French decision to privatize Aerospatiale is pivotal. The
merger shows that European defense-industry integration is
France's priority. 166 Moreover, the Aerospatiale-Matra merger
creates, in one move, a group encompassing a variety of busi-
nesses including "Europe's largest guided weapons, satellites
and helicopter companies, a substantial software engineering
159 See id.
16 Martin Sieff, Ready for Take Off? Europeans Eye Consolidation of Aerospace
Firms, WASH. TIMES, March 2, 1998, at A16, available in 1998 WL 3441213.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Douglas Hamilton, BAe and Dasa Plan Europe Defence Tie-up: Aviation Shares
Take Off on Merger Speculation, HERALD (United Kingdom), July 25, 1998, at 23,
available in 1998 WL 8172454. (Matra is the defense sector of Lagardere, another
industry conglomerate.)
164 See Amy Barrett, Aerospatiale Will Be Privatized Following Merger, ASIAN WALL
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and communications business, plus significant shareholdings in
Europe's prime commercial aircraft group, Airbus, [and a] re-
gional aircraft group ATR and combat aircraft company Das-
sault Aviation. ' 67  Unfortunately, however, this merger is
accompanied by German and British fears that the government
in Paris will gain too much power through this privatization." 16
Consolidation appears to be Europe's ultimate goal, and
there are other forms of real progress toward realizing the vision
of unity. For example, the Spanish and Italian governments
have already begun privatizing their defense and aerospace in-
dustries.169 The privatization of Spain's CASA could be com-
pleted by the end of 1999.170 Moreover, the merger between
Italy's Finmeccanica and Britain's General Electric Co., which
would merge the companies' missile, naval and radar systems
businesses, is viewed as, "a key step in state-owned Finmeccan-
ica's move to privatization.' ' 71  A joint holding company in the
Netherlands will manage the operation, and the companies may
merge other divisions in the future. 172
In addition, GEC-Marconi, after recently acquiring Tracor for
$1.4 billion, is interested in American corporations, specifically
some units of Northrop Grumman.1 73  Northrop Grumman,
however, claims that it is not interested in selling its assets.174
Nevertheless, this is an example of transnational cooperation
that may be surfacing.
Interestingly, the United States Government and the Euro-
pean Commission recently approved the $35 billion merger be-
tween Daimler-Benz of Germany and Chrysler, thereby making
the German company's aerospace unit forty-seven percent
American owned.1 75
167 Alexis Rendell, Attacking MOVES (Aerospataile, Matra Hautes Technologies
Merger), FLIGHT INT'L, July 28, 1998, available in 1998 WL 11807002.
16- See France's European Partners Fear Industrial Domination, DEF. NEWS, August 3,
1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 9010101.
-. See John D. Morrocco & Michael A. Taverna, Consolidation Plans Hinge on
French Role Efforts to Create a Single European Aerospace/Defense Firm Undercut by Paris'
Foot-Dragging Over Aerospatiale, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., April 6, 1998, avail-
able in 1998 WL 8143258.
170 See id.
171 Id. (The merger should lead to annual revenues of $1.5 billion. See id.)
172 Id. (The companies avianics, guns, and armored vehicle sections could be-
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Trans-Atlantic alliances are a tradition in the industry in order
to share risk, knowledge, and technology between companies.
In addition to the cooperation between British Aerospace and
Lockheed Martin on the Joint Strike Fighter program, there are
multiple examples of such international working cooperations.
For example, British Aerospace creates wings and wing parts for
Airbus and Boeing - even though both companies are vying for
control of the civil aircraft market.17' Boeing provides "systems
for British Aerospace's Nimrod early warning and reconnais-
sance aircraft. ' 177 Additionally, Boeing jets have Rolls-Royce en-
gines. 11 Similarly, Daimler-Benz Aerospace Co. and Pratt &
Whitney (an American engine producer) have a strategic alli-
ance, while Daimler-Benz and Rockwell Corp. build "a tail-less
aircraft as a technology demonstrator. 1 7 9
VII. MERGERS OF SECOND AND THIRD TIER
COMPANIES AND DIVISIONS
Although the U.S. Defense Department opposed the merger
between Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, it will sup-
port second and third-tier level mergers and acquisitions, pro-
vided the combined companies do not threaten efficient
competition. 180
There is a whole different level of subcontractors that must
come together if they are going to compete. After all, contrac-
tors are realizing that two or three subcontractors are easier to
deal with than ten or twelve.' 8 ' Hence, there will be an unprece-
dented wave of mergers within this level of defense and aero-
space producers.
For example, large second-tier companies may make some ac-
quisitions. General Dynamics Corp., the submarine and tank
maker out of Falls Church, Virginia, has indicated its interest in
expanding. 8 2 The rocket motor producer Cordant Technolo-




180 See Velocci, supra note 99, at 23.
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gies Inc., formerly Thiokol Corp., is another company interested
in expanding beyond its current line of production.1 3
VIII. OTHER GLOBAL EFFECTS
A. ASIA
There is also a slow, but steadily rising Asia-Pacific sector in
the competitive aerospace industry. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus-
tries, Kawasaki, and Samsung are among the top competitors, in
Asia. None have made moves from suppliers to prime contrac-
tors, but the long-term nature of the business indicates that such
a move will likely occur in the future."8 4
B. RussA
While Russia's defense industry may not be prominent like
Europe's, it is alive. Russia will offer to manufacture medium
range Tu-214 airliners for Iran, which will be manufactured by a
company in Kazan, the capital of the Tatarstan Republic.I8 5 Ad-
ditionally "[o]ut of [the] Russian air companies, the Aeroflot-
Russian International Airlines is interested in purchasing ten
planes, the Khabarovsk Airline [is interested in] ten[,] and the
State Transport Company "Russia" [is interested in] two," at an
average price of $25 million each. 86 Sales are most promising
in China, Asia, and in the Middle East; but sales are not likely in
Europe due to the competition of Boeing and Airbus.
C. ISRAEL
Israel has been criticized by the general manager of Elisra,
one of Israel's top defense companies, for not promoting and
encouraging the consolidation of duplicate defense compa-
nies."' For example, three Israeli companies operate in the
electronic warfare (EW) sector, yet there has been no move to
merge the companies. 88 General manager Avner Raz urged the
government that "[t] his idea should be treated seriously, consid-
183 See id.
184 O'Toole, supra note 3.
185 See Itar-Tass Economic News Digest of Januay 19, TEL. AGENCY OF THE SOVIET
UNION, Jan. 19, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Ttass File.
186 Id.
17 See Ministry Criticized for Not Doing Enough to Help Defense Industries, BBC SUM-
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ering that the worldwide EW market is [worth] $5 billion dollars
annually." '189 The Israeli aerospace sector should not be over-
looked as a competitor because Elisra outbid Luton of the
United States for a contract to supply $40 million of EW systems
for naval planes in Australia.19 It also sold $15 million worth of
systems to Germany and will be supplying passive early warning
systems for Israel's Black Hawk and Yasur helicopters.19 '
D. CHINA
Although the Chinese civil aircraft market is controlled by
Boeing-McDonnell Douglas, Chinese officials have stated that
they want to increase Airbus's current market share of fifteen
percent in order to bring Airbus closer to Boeing's market share
level. 192
Interestingly, Airbus has a sector in China called Airbus Indus-
try China, and because the Asia-Pacific region has pulled in one
quarter of Airbus's total sales, this region proves to be an inte-
gral market for Airbus. 19' Airbus acknowledges that there is an
enormous potential for an increase in China's market.
E. TAIwAN
Taiwan began focusing on the aerospace industry over the
past two decades so that it could improve its technology and in-
dustrial capabilities in order to better compete in the world mar-
ket. 94  One hundred and seventy public and private
organizations make up Taiwan's aerospace industry.1 95 It em-
ploys roughly 11,500 personnel and produces some $400 million
in aerospace related manufacturing.196 By 2000, Taiwan wants
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Taiwanese officials have furthermore claimed that the aero-
space industry is "one of the ten industries of vital importance to
Taiwan's economic future."' 8 In fact, an agenda was set in 1995
to make Taiwan an "'Asia-Pacific Aircraft Repair and Mainte-
nance Center' within the next five years."'
9 9
Currently, France and the United States supply 90.2% of Tai-
wan's total import value, and the aggregate value of imported
aircraft repair parts is $90 million.0 0 It is unquestionable that
Taiwan wants to develop its own industry for aircraft parts, but
only a handful of Taiwan's companies can satisfy Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA) standards.20 '
Imports will remain important for Taiwan for the near future,
and competition from other countries should increase as illus-
trated by Airbus selling aircraft to Taiwan. But, American sup-
pliers will probably continue to dominate the market. 20 2
Taiwanese officials are encouraging domestic firms to cooper-
ate and work with foreign firms in order to build a viable aero-
space industry.2 3 Taiwanese corporations are slowly beginning
to compete with such cooperative joint venture programs. For
example, Lockheed Martin, in 1996, formed an $87 million co-
operation through which it will transfer technologies and com-
puter software in an effort to help bolster Taiwan's aviation
maintenance industry.2114 Moreover, Taiwan will manufacture
fifty percent of rudders for Dassault Aviation's Falcon line of
aircraft. 2 5
Basically, Taiwan has four prominent organizations that pro-
vide for its aerospace research and development. Two of the
four (the Committee for Aviation and Space Industry Develop-
ment (CASID) and the Center for Aviation and Space Technol-
ogy (CAST)) actively promote the industry and its potential.20 6
Currently, Taiwan's aerospace industry is focusing on develop-
ing, manufacturing, assembling and selling regional aircraft."
7
198 Wendy Tien, Taiwan-Aircraft Parts for Repair and Maintenance, NAT'L TRADE
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F. AUSTRALIA
Australia has very few aircraft manufacturers and as a result,
must import almost all aircraft and parts.2 °8 Interestingly, the
total Australian aerospace industry employs only 12,000 people
and has revenues of $1.5 billion - compared to $85 billion in
the United States and $47 billion in the European Economic
Community.209 The Australian aerospace industry "is becoming
more trade oriented with manufactured exports in excess of
$350 million," and an additional $350 million in re-exports.21 0
The total revenues for aircraft maintenance and repair in Aus-
tralia is roughly $400 million.21 '
Australia, however, is a great opportunity for American suppli-
ers of aircraft and parts. The United States leads in aircraft,
parts, and ground support equipment sales, and Australian sup-
pliers can anticipate steady growth.212 Moreover, "[t]here is a
strong preference for U.S. produced equipment in all areas of
aviation and aerospace in Australia, both in defense and civil
markets. ' 213 Further, Kaman Aerospace, a smaller U.S. com-
pany, will provide the Australian Navy with the SH2-G helicop-
ter, which is an encouraging sign that other contenders can
enter the competitive market.214
The Australian Government has established defense procure-
ment policies that identify the aerospace industry as a specific
industry to be developed.2 5 Boeing, as a result of acquiring
Rockwell, recently formed Boeing-Australia, which is its first op-
eration based outside the United States.21 6 Other U.S. compa-
nies have also created a stronger presence in Australia in an
effort to profit from already planned military aircraft
purchases.1 7
208 See Phil Keeling, Australia - Aircraft and Parts, NAT'L TRADE DATA BANK










JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
G. TuRKEY
Out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) coun-
tries, Turkey has the second largest army. Nevertheless, it must
import most if its advanced weapons from the United States and
other Western countries. 218 Currently several companies are
competing for a $3 billion contract to build 145 combat helicop-
ters for Turkey.219 Companies from seven countries have ex-
pressed an interest in the contract, including Boeing-McDonnell
Douglas and Bell Helicopter Textron (the AH-1 Cobra
maker) .220
IX. CONCLUSION
The big three mergers in the U.S. defense industry have sent
a world-wide message to corporations in the aerospace and de-
fense industries. If existing corporations want to survive in an
intensely fierce market, they must act now or Boeing-McDonnell
Douglas, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon-Hughes will continue
to dominate the civil and defense industries.
The European Airbus consortium is rising to the challenge
and aggressively pursuing half of the aircraft market share. The
European Union also acknowledges the threat of competition
and is pulling its Member States together to attack the American
giants. The new millennium presents a challenge in that it will
make or break the European Union's hold on the aerospace
market.
The United States and Europe are undoubtedly the
predominate contenders in the aerospace and defense indus-
tries; however, corporations in other countries will attempt to
survive locally through joint ventures and cooperation with the
big players.
Nevertheless, the mergers and acquisitions of the 1990s have
changed the aerospace and defense industries forever and have
sparked a new round of consolidation to move this industry into
the new millennium.
218 See U.S. Firms to Bid for Producing Choppers for Turkey, XINHUA NEws AGENCY,
Jan. 5, 1998, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Xinhua File.
219 See id.
220 See id.
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